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A Reliability Model for Dependent and Distributed
MDS Disk Array Units
Suayb S. Arslan, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Archiving and systematic backup of large digital
data generates a quick demand for multi-peta byte scale storage
systems. As drive capacities continue to grow beyond the few
terabytes range to address the demands of today’s cloud, the
likelihood of having multiple/simultaneous disk failures become
a reality. Among the main factors causing catastrophic system
failures, correlated disk failures and the network bandwidth
are reported to be the two common source of performance
degradation. The emerging trend is to use efficient/sophisticated
erasure codes (EC) equipped with multiple parities and efficient
repairs in order to meet the reliability/bandwidth requirements.
It is known that mean time to failure and repair rates reported by
the disk manufacturers cannot capture life cycle patterns of dis-
tributed storage systems. In this study, we develop failure models
based on generalized Markov chains that can accurately capture
correlated performance degradations with multi-parity protection
schemes based on modern Maximum Distance Separable (MDS)
EC. Furthermore, we use the proposed model in a distributed
storage scenario to quantify two example use cases: Primarily, the
common sense that adding more parity disks are only meaningful
if we have a decent decorrelation between the failure domains
of storage systems and the reliability of generic multiple single-
dimensional EC protected storage systems.
Keywords—Maximum Distance Separability, Markov chains, Dis-
tributed Storage, Mean time to data loss, Erasure coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increased gap between the capacity and the input/output data
access rates of commercial disks, coupled with the increased
appeal for thousands of small component commodity storage
units, have lead to the development of disk arrays. However, in-
corporating such a large volume of disks into the array leads to
increased and correlated failure rates, even in some cases worse
than that of a single disk [1]. Large number of installations of
such disk arrays result in an overall decreased reliability. For
example, it is well known that the extensions of the Redundant
Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) [2] systems are envisioned
to tolerate situations in which two or more disk failures happen
due to increased failure rates [3]. In case of reconstruction or
the so called repair process of the failed component disks,
excessive read requests for data regeneration might have to
be serviced due to the increased capacities and therefore, the
recovery process becomes susceptible to incumbent read errors
as well as the network failures. This is another reason that the
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traditional parity-based RAID (e.g. RAID 5 and RAID 6 [4])
systems fail to meet today’s reliability requirements for digital
data storage.
Rising trend for storing large volumes of data led to im-
provements on basic RAID (e.g. efficient implementations of
RAID 6), forcing manufacturers to add extra parity disks to
RAID 5 setting in order to boost the reliability performance of
disk arrays. All versions of RAID are typically implemented
in hardware and are based on erasure codes with the optimal
capacity-recovery property, known as maximum distance sepa-
rable (MDS) constraint. Especially, when the stored data is of
small volume and the scale of the storage system is moderate,
RAID techniques were found to be excellent options with
enough user data protection. While the scale of storage systems
expand and the requirements of different applications change
over time, reliability and scalability of RAID systems became
questionable [5] which led to some of the research efforts to
search for techniques at the disk array level to improve RAID’s
reliability [6].
When the component disks happen to be in the same
geographical location, or mounted in the same network storage
node, correlated failures become the performance bottleneck.
For example, failures within a batch of disks are observed to be
strongly correlated [5]. Disks that belong to the same manufac-
turer usually go through the same manufacturing process and
made of the same type of magnetic and electronic materials.
Their similarity does not decrease dramatically even if the
manufacturers are different, because the core materials used in
the production phase are similar, if not the same. Furthermore,
disks that end up in the same box or a network storage node
are subject to the same type of environmental conditions.
Such environmental conditions affect the overall disk array
reliability almost the same way under normal circumstances.
Plus, such disks share the same support hardware. Whenever
a catastrophic error occurs in the hardware [7], it can easily
cause multiple and simultaneous disk failures.
A. Related Work
With the raise of modern erasure codes that allow network-
efficient repairs [8] and minimize the data read times while ser-
vicing user data requests degraded reads or data regeneration
requests, the time it takes to maintain the system operability,
repair the data and the hardware, balance the system with
necessary data transmissions have completely transformed the
old reliability problem into very hard one to predict. However,
for a reliable and optimized system design such predictions
are very crucial and necessary.
In [9], the first Markov chain reliability analysis of disk
arrays is performed. Following this study, slight generalizations
2have been made to the basic model [10], [11]. For instance
in [12], a kind of enhanced reliability modelling is proposed.
Later, more realistic failure phenomena are introduced to the
model to address accuracy problem such as latent error and
bit rod cases [13]. In [14], it is shown that with few more
generalizations, the basic model can also be used for non-
MDS disk arrays. Although [15] disputes with conventional
metrics and proposes a new one based on the average data
loss, they fail to provide a comprehensive model and closed
form expressions that capture the correlated nature of failures.
In some previous works such as [16], subtleties regarding cor-
related failures is considered. However no specific reliability
modelling is proposed. On the other hand, studies like [17]
considers only little work on quantifying correlated failure
problem and providing a framework to minimize its impact.
Rather, a model is proposed to calculate the survivability of
data objects stored on heterogeneous storage systems.
To the best of our knowledge, all of these previous reliability
models proposed for disk arrays cannot accurately capture
some real time phenomena such as common failure dependen-
cies or accurately predicting the lifespan of storage systems
protected by modern erasure codes that use the network and
computation resources effectively [18]. Inspired by this obser-
vation, we propose a generalized Markov model that can be
used to analyze disk failures under such dependent factors. For
instance using the proposed model, we are able to validate and
accurately quantify an experimental observation that adding
more parity only has significant effect on reliability if we
have independent disk failure rates which was conventionally
identified and compensated by declustering methods [19].
Particularly, we shall argue that if disk failure rates depend
on the number of previously failed disks, then this argument
is no longer true. For a given exponential failure rate growth
model, we show that we can exactly quantify the maximum
number of parity disks (e.g. 4 or 5) beyond which adding more
parity disks has practically no effect on the overall reliability
of the system and therefore can be considered to be a waste
of resources. On the other hand, the proposed model will
be shown to be useful for estimating the reliability of disk
arrays which are protected by modern and sophisticated erasure
coding schemes such as pyramid codes [20]. The ability to
incorporate new metrics such as repair bandwidth, average read
overhead, etc. in to the model is deemed to be very important
for the reliability estimation of the next generation distributed
and networked storage systems.
Most of the MDS erasure correcting codes are applied
to a series of disks, constituting MDS disk array schemes.
In general, such a class of MDS-based protection schemes
are considered as t dimensional (t-D) MDS disk protection
schemes to create a more robust system against disk failures.
For example, a special case of such class of MDS-based
protection schemes is considered in [7]. We mostly focus
on one dimensional MDS protection schemes in this study,
however it can be shown that the model can be used to derive
closed form expressions for multi dimensional MDS disk
arrays [21] and code structures [22]. Furthermore, although it is
out of scope of this paper, we can show that the general model
proposed in this study can be used to predict reliability for non-
MDS codes [23], [24], array BP-XOR codes[25], [26] as well
as repair–efficient codes [27],[28] under novel opportunistic
repair mechanisms [29].
More recently, information dispersal has gained attraction
due to its reliable operation compared to conventional disk
arrays [3]. For a given distributed information scenario, we
also consider in this study a network storage system consisting
of few nodes and two commonly employed disk allocation
strategies (horizontal and vertical) for stripped 1-D MDS-
protected disk arrays. We analytically evaluate their reliability
based on the proposed general Markov model and argue that
given a correlated disk failure growth model, information
dispersal achieves more reliable data protection. Alternatively,
we also argue that for a given reliability target, it leads to less
use of redundant disks, particularly using vertical allocation.
The latter ultimately means considerable amount of savings in
terms of resources without compromising the target reliability.
Finally, we remark that allocation is a critical part of the
information dispersal paradigm and we only considered two
straightforward methods in this study. We anticipate to con-
sider the reliability analysis of more advanced data allocation
strategies as our future work.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we provide brief information about MDS disk array systems
and the concept of Error Protection Groups (EPGs). In Section
III, we introduce the general failure model based on Markov
chains along with a low complexity scheme to calculate the
mean time to data loss. We also give failure growth rates of
interest as functions of the number of operational disks of pro-
tection groups. Moreover, we show the extension of the general
model to cover advanced features such as hard errors, initial
defective disks and average read overhead. In Section IV, we
consider an information dispersal scenario using horizontal and
vertical allocations of disks in a distributed setting using the
proposed failure model. Some numerical results are provided
at the end of both Section III and Section IV. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper. Some of the short proofs are included
within the text whereas more sophisticated ones are moved to
the end of the paper in appendices A-C to make the paper flow
smoothly.
II. STORAGE ARRAYS BASED ON MDS CODES AND
ERROR PROTECTION GROUPS
Recent developments in hard and solid state disk array in-
dustry and well known experimental survey data [5] confirmed
complex, dependent and non-uniform failure rates across the
constituent storage units for large scale data storage applica-
tions. In particular, disk replacement rates show significant
correlation between constituent disks and are no where near
manufactures’ reported disk failure rates.
For storage space efficiency, disk array systems typically use
Reed Solomon-based [30] MDS erasure codes with efficient
implementations of encoding and decoding processes [31],
[32]. All component disks over which the parity information
is computed and at which the computed redundancy is stored
3m p
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Figure 1. a) An EPG consists of m data and p parity disk units generated by
using a (m + p,m) MDS code. This is also known as 1-D MDS disk array.
b) A 2-D MDS disk array is shown in which data disks are both horizontally
and vertically encoded using (m1+p1, m1) and (m2+p2,m2) MDS codes,
respectively.
is called an EPG. A MDS (n,m) erasure correcting code is
applied to the m data disks to generate p = n − m parity
disks in order to make up a n-disk EPG. Since the code is
MDS, it can recover up to p failed disks in an EPG. Disk
stripping is used to allocate data and parity information units
across and along the disk arrays in order not to have dedicated
parity or data disks [33] for better I/O performance. Fig. 1.a
shows an example EPG i.e., 1-D MDS disk array, consisting
of m data and p parity disks made up of multiple storage units
such as sectors in hard disk systems. Note that these protection
schemes are not limited to single dimension. An example for
2-D MDS disk arrays is shown in Fig. 1.b where in addition
to horizontal MDS encoding, there is also a vertical MDS
encoding that provides extra robustness against disk failures.
Each disk in the array is part of two different EPGs and the
data can efficiently be recovered by a collaborative decoding
of EPGs using iterative algorithms. In general, any subset of
data blocks can be used to form EPGs [20] which may provide
additional advantages for different use cases.
In order to characterize the data durability in terms of Mean
Time to Data Loss (MTTDL) metric for general subsets of
EPGs using MDS codes, we need a generalized Markov model.
This model needs to capture the dependent failure as well as
concurrent repair rates. Plus it should involve error rates that
can model total system crashes no matter how many extra
parities are available. We will show that such a generalized
model will be sufficient to capture different realistic scenarios
for MDS protected storage arrays.
III. A GENERALIZED MARKOV FAILURE MODEL
We use MTTDL metric to quantify the average reliability of
a given protected array of storage devices. Although there are
studies arguing that MTTDL is a deficient tool for the absolute
measurements [15] and a system designer may be interested in
the probability of failure for the first few years instead of the
mean time to failure, MTTDL is still one of the most widely
used intuitive reliability estimation metric that helps system
designers to make accurate decisions. Moreover, this notorious
reliability metric, based on exponential failure and repair times,
has been shown to be insensitive to the actual distribution of
failure/repair times as long as the constituent storage devices
have much larger mean time between failures than the mean
repair time [34] and operate independent of each other. Thus,
using MTTDL and known distributions we can simply generate
an answer to the probability of failure for the first few years
pretty accurately. Plus, closed form expressions for MTTDL
shall be shown to be possible in this study for a general case
and such analytical expressions usually help our intuition for
modeling error–tolerant data storage systems.
The reliability characteristics of many storage devices follow
what is usually known as ”bathtub curve” [35]. This curve
is a composite of decreasing, constant and increasing failure
rates at different times of the device lifetime. When disks are
put into the service, the internal defective components fail
quite rapidly. This leads to increased failure rates and the time
where such failures take place is described as “infant mortality
period”. When the disk enters into steady state in which only
random errors dominate, the failure rates show steadiness.
Thus, disks are in “useful life period” and show constant failure
rates. However, disks exhibit constant failure rates in their
useful life period only if they work individually [36]. A simple
failure model is given in [10] which is considered to be a
sufficient model for reliability estimations of EPGs containing
n disk units using a MDS code. As the disks age and wear due
to different types of stresses and physical damages, the “wear
out period” kicks in and the failure rates start increasing again.
In an EPG, there are more than one disk component which
work concurrently. In addition, a subset of disks may share the
same hardware backend, once failed it will disallow access to
all of the subset of disks. As argued before for such concurrent
operations, a correct failure model must accommodate the
dependent failures. Thus, a failure in an EPG will have an
effect on the failure rates of the remaining disk components.
In order to describe such a dependency with a simple model,
we begin with a classical independent failure assumption and
let the failure rate to vary based on the number of failed disks
in the disk array.
We propose to use the generalized Markov model shown
in Fig. 2. We assume a disk failure rate of λ0 and a repair
rate of µ0 at the beginning of operation. We also allowed
transitions from any state j, n ≥ j ≥ m + 1 to the failure
state F . The rate of these transitions is called error rates
and are quantified by γi. We can use error rates to model
device dependent hard failures, multiple MDS array systems,
non-MDS protected disk arrays or incorporate more realis-
tic features. Thus, the proposed failure model is completely
determined by the parameters n, m, the set of failure rates
λ = {λ0, . . . , λn−m}, repair rates µ = {µ0, . . . , µn−m−1}
and error rates γ = {γ0, . . . , γn−m−1}.
In our model, the labels on each state designate the number
of operational and accessible disks in an EPG. As can be ob-
served from Fig. 2, if more than p = n−m disk failures happen
at anytime, then the system goes into failure state (F ). In the
proposed general model, the disks are assumed to be repaired
individually and the repair process produces all repaired disks
at once i.e., concurrent maintenance. Particularly, since we are
interested in 1-D MDS arrays, it is unnecessary to introduce
γis in which case it becomes possible to quantify MTTDL
4n n− 1 . . . j . . . m+ 1 m
F
nλ0
µ0
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Figure 2. A generalized Markov failure model in which the labels on each state designate the number of operational number of disks in an EPG. In general,
we have the relationship λ0 < λ1 < · · · < λn−m to describe the increasing failure rates as we have more and more disks fail within the same EPG. F: Failure
state.
in a closed form. For better tractability, we will focus on the
reduced model with γi = 0 in the next section and then extend
results to comprise the more general model given in Fig. 2.
A. Mean time to Data Loss Performance
The MTTDL is a measure used to quantify the average time
before the storage system goes into the failure state F . Let us
associate with each state Pi(t), the probability of being in state
i at time t. Using a similar notation with [10], the reliability
function R(t) is the probability of being in one of the states
n, . . . ,m at time t, and is given by
R(t) = Pn(t) + Pn−1(t) + · · ·+ Pm+1(t) + Pm(t) (1)
Now suppose that the disk lifetime random variable t
has the probability density function f(t) and the reliability
functionR(t) ,
∫∞
t f(x)dx. The MTTDL using p parity disks
(denoted by MTTDLp) is defined as [36]
MTTDLp , E[t] =
∫ ∞
0
tf(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
t
(−dR(t)
dt
)
dt
= −tR(t)|∞0 +
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt (2)
Laplace transform of the reliability function in Eqn. (1) i.e.,
LR(s) is instrumental for evaluating the integral,
LR(s) ,
∫ ∞
0
R(t)e−stdt (3)
=⇒ LR(0) = MTTDLp =
m+p∑
j=m
LPj (0) (4)
We can write the following state transition equations based
on Fig. 2 with γi = 0,
dPn(t)
dt
+ λ0nPn(t)− µ0Pn−1(t)− 2µ1Pn−2(t)− . . .
−pµn−m+1Pm(t) = 0
−λ0nPn(t) +
dPn−1(t)
dt
+ (λ1(n− 1) + µ0)Pn−1(t) = 0
−λ1(n− 1)Pn−1(t) +
dPn−2(t)
dt
+ (λ2(n− 2) + 2µ1)Pn−2(t) = 0
...
...
...
...
... = 0
−λn−m−1(m+ 1)Pm+1(t) +
dPm(t)
dt
+ . . .
(λn−mm+ pµn−m−1)Pm(t) = 0
−λn−mmPm(t) +
dPF (t)
dt
= 0
with initial conditions Pn(0) = 1, Pj(0) = 0 for j =
n − 1, n − 2, . . . ,m + 1,m,F since all disks are assumed to
be operational at the beginning. Taking the Laplace transform
of each equation will yield linear equations in the transform
domain. Finally, we replace the coefficients of each linear
equation to form a p+2×p+2 matrix A(s), as shown in the
next page with γi = 0.
Thus, using linear algebra we have the following equation
to solve:
A(s)P(s) = N(0) (5)
where P(s) = [LPn(s) . . . LPm+1(s) LPm(s) LPF (s)]
T
and N(l) = [0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 0]T where (l+1)th array
entry is unity. Once we solve for P(s), it is straightforward
to compute MTTDLp =
∑m+p
j=m LPj (0). Let us consider an
example with p = 1. By solving the Eqn. (5), we obtain
LPm+1(s) = (λ1m+ s+ µ0)/φ1(s) (6)
LPm(s) = (λ0(m+ 1))/φ1(s) (7)
LPF (s) = (λ0λ1m(m+ 1))/sφ1(s) (8)
where φ1(s) = s(s+µ0+λ0(m+1)+λ1m)+λ0λ1m(m+1)
and the mean time to data loss is therefore given by
MTTDL1 =
m+1∑
j=m
LPj (0) =
λ0(m+ 1) + λ1m+ µ0
λ0λ1m(m+ 1)
(9)
5LPn(s)s+ λ0nLPn(s)− µ0LPn−1(s)− 2µ1LPn−2(s)− · · · − pµn−m−1LPm(s) = Pn(0) = 1
−λ0nLPn(s) + LPn−1(s)s+ λ1(n− 1)LPn−1(s) + µ0LPn−1(s) = Pn−1(0) = 0
−λ1(n− 1)LPn−1(s) + LPn−2(s)s+ λ2(n− 2)LPn−2(s) + 2µ1LPn−2(s) = Pn−2(0) = 0
...
...
...
...
... = 0
−λn−m−1(m+ 1)LPm+1(s) + LPm(s)s+ λn−mmLPm(s) + pµn−m−1LPm(s) = Pm(0) = 0
−λn−mmLPm(s) + LPF (s)s = PF (0) = 0
Similarly, we can compute for p = 2 as follows.
MTTDL2 =
m+2∑
j=m
LPj (0)
=
(2µ1 + λ2m)(λ0(m+ 2) + λ1(m+ 1) + µ0)
λ0λ1λ2m(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
+
1
λ2m
(10)
As can be seen, expressions are getting more complex as
we increase the number of parity disks/blocks, p even in the
absence of error rates γi ∈ γ.
B. Efficient Computation of MTTDL
As can be seen for large n and p, it becomes harder
to solve Eqn. (5) and numerically unstable to find A−1(s).
Particularly storage systems that use fountain–like codes to
generate boundless number of parities [37] and large number of
network nodes for data distribution shall benefit from efficient
and generalized formula for MTTDLp. For a given EPG of
size n disks, we present below a straightforward method to
efficiently compute MTTDLp for any p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}.
For x = 0, 1, . . . , p− 1, we begin by defining the following
array with entries,
Λ
(p)
x ,


λ0(m+ p)
λ1(m+ p− 1)
λ2(m+ p− 2)
...
λp−1(m+ 1)


+V(p)x




0
µ0
2µ1
..
.
(p− 1)µp−2

+


γ0
γ1
γ2
..
.
γp−1



 (11)
where
V
(p)
x =
[
0x 0x×p−x
0p−x×x Ip−x
]
(12)
and Ip−x and 0x represent identity and all-zero matrices,
respectively.
Theorem 3.1: Let us assume Λpx(j) denote the (j + 1)-th
entry of the array Λ(p)x . If we let γi = 0 then, we have the
following transform domain expressions evaluated at s = 0,
LPm+p−x(0) =
(pµp−1 + λpm)
φp(0)
p−1∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j) (13)
LPm(0) =
1
φp(0)
p−1∏
i=0
λi(m+ 1 + i) (14)
where the denominator is given by
φp(0) =
p∏
i=0
λi(m+ i) (15)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
From Eqns. (14) and (15), we can deduce LPm(0) =
1/λpm. Therefore, using Theorem 3.1 we find a closed form
expression for MTTDLp as follows,
MTTDLp =
(pµp−1 + λpm)
φp(0)
p−1∑
x=0
p−1∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j) +
1
λpm
One can check the accuracy of the general form by setting
p = 1 and p = 2 and comparing the results with Eqns (9) and
(10). In addition, assuming a fixed failure and repair rates, i.e.,
λi = λ and µi−1 = µ for all i, we can easily realize that these
expressions are the generalized versions of the results found
in [10].
Alternatively, MTTDLp can be computed using numerical
tools by recognizing that
Ap+1(s)Pp+1(s) = N
(0)
p+1 (16)
where the subscript p + 1 denotes the upper left square
submatrix if it is a matrix and the first p+1 entries if it is an
array. Hence, [LPn(0) LPn−1(0) . . . LPm−1(0) LPm(0)] =
lims→0A
−1
p+1(s)N
(0)
p+1. Therefore, we have
MTTDLp =
n∑
j=m
LPj (0) = lim
s→0
(
A
−1
p+1(s)N
(0)
p+11
T
)
(17)
where 1 is the row array of ones. Here the matrix inverse is
the part that is costly and numerically unreliable for large p.
Let us consider the most general expression for A(s)
shown above. Thus, we can still use Equation (17) to quantify
MTTDLp. However, the expressions given in Theorem 3.1 for
efficient MTTDL computation holds except φp(0) which did
6A(s) =


s+ λ0n+ γ0 −µ0 −2µ1 . . . −pµn−m−1 0
−λ0n s+λ1(n−1)+µ0+γ1 0 . . . 0 0
0 −λ1(n− 1) s+λ2(n−2)+2µ1+γ2 . . . 0 0
0 0 −λ2(n− 2) . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . 0 0
0 0 . . . −λn−m−1(m+ 1) s+λn−mm+pµn−m−1 0
−γ0 −γ1 . . . −γn−m−1 −λn−mm s


.
not depend on γi. We provide the following recursive relation
without proof for computing φp(0). The proof can be obtained
using induction for the known values of ξt. For 1 ≤ t ≤ p
and the initial condition φ0(0) = nλ0, we have the following
recursion
φt(0) =
t∏
i=0
λi(n− i)
+ (tµt−1 + λt(n− t))
[
φt−1(0)−
t−1∏
i=0
λi(n− i)
+ γt−1
(
t−2∏
i=0
(γi + λi(n− i)) + ξt
)]
(18)
where ξt ≥ 0 is some small number whose closed form
expression is an open problem. However, using symbolic
algebra tools, we can obtain few initial evaluations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0
and ξ3 = γ0µ0.
Corollary 3.1.1: If γj = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ p − 1, we have
φp(0) =
∏p
i=0 λi(m+ i).
Proof: Due to hypothesis γj = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ p− 1, we
do not need to worry about ξts since they cancel out. Then,
it is easy to verify that φt(0) =
∏t
j=0 λj(n − j). By setting
t = p and using the change of variables i = p− j, the result
follows.
Thus, above corollary verifies Equation (15). We observe
that if we set ξt = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ p, we get φ∗p(0) ≤ φp(0)
where
φ∗t (0) =
t∏
i=0
λi(n− i)+ (19)
(tµt−1 + λt(n− t))
[
φ∗t−1(0)−
t−1∏
i=0
λi(n− i) (20)
+ γt−1
t−2∏
i=0
(γi + λi(n− i))
]
(21)
with φ∗0(0) = nλ0. This implies that if we replace φp(0) with
φ∗p(0) we can find the upper bound for MTTDLp as follows.
MTTDLp =
m+p∑
j=m
LPj (0) ≤
1
φ∗p(0)
p∑
x=0
p∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j)
where equality strictly holds for p = 1, 2. For p > 2, the error
value in the overestimation (the upper bound) can be found
using the following closed form expression which quantifies
the relationship between φ∗p(0) and φp(0).
Theorem 3.2: Let φ∗p(0) be an underestimator of φp(0) as
defined above, we have
φp(0)− φ∗p(0) =
p∑
i=3
γi−1ξi
p∏
j=i
(jµj−1 + λj(n− j))
Proof: It is sufficient to prove the following for 1 ≤ t ≤ p,
φt(0)− φ∗t (0) =
t∑
i=1
γi−1ξi
t∏
j=i
(jµj−1 + λj(n− j)) (22)
For t = 1, we have φ1(0)−φ∗1(0) = γ0ξ1(µ0+λ1(n− 1)).
This is easy to verify because we have φ∗0(0) = φ0(0) = nλ0.
Now suppose that Equation 22 holds for t, and let us show
that the same holds for t+ 1. Using Equations (18), (21) and
the hypothesis (22) we have φt+1(0)− φ∗t+1(0) equals
= ((t+ 1)µt + λt+1(n− t− 1)) [φt(0)− φ∗t (0) + γtξt+1]
=
t∑
i=1
γi−1ξi
t+1∏
j=i
(jµj−1 + λj(n− j)) +
γtξt+1((t+ 1)µt + λt+1(n− t− 1)) (23)
=
t+1∑
i=3
γi−1ξi
t+1∏
j=i
(jµj−1 + λj(n− j)) (24)
which follows from the fact that ξ1 = ξ2 = 0. The proof
completes if we let t = p.
C. MTTDL with hard errors
The general Markov model analyzed earlier is pretty useful
for advanced reliability calculations. Here we give one of the
simplest improvements over the classical reliability modeling,
namely the hard errors that our Markov model can easily
incorporate. Hard errors in modern storage arrays are observed
to be necessary when the system operates in the critical mode
i.e., a state in which one more device failure leads to total
system crash and/or data loss. This requirement is easily
covered by the general Markov model introduced in this study.
Let ν represent the probability of seeing an uncorrectable error
per device read during say a device rebuilt process. Let UCER
denote the uncorrectable error rate of the device (such as
10−15, expressed in terms of errors per number of bytes or
bits read), η is typically given by [14]
7η = 1− (1− UCER)device capacity (25)
A transition is needed from state m + 1 to state F in
order to model the rate at which the system encounters an
uncorrectable error while reading and/or rebuilding failed
device data. Note that the probability of encountering an
uncorrectable error when reading m devices for rebuild (Note
here that we assume conventional MDS codes, which may
require many device reads and devices encounter uncorrectable
errors independently) is given by
PUCER = 1− (1 − η)m (26)
Based on the analysis given in [14], the uncorrectable error
rate for an EPG is computed as the product of the rate that
a disk fails when m + 1 devices are available and PUCER.
In order to integrate this probability into the general Markov
model introduced earlier, we have to make the following
replacements
(m+ 1)λp−1 ⇒ (m+ 1)λp−1(1− PUCER)
= (m+ 1)λp−1(1− η)m (27)
γp−1 ⇒ (m+ 1)λp−1PUCER
= (m+ 1)λp−1(1− (1− η)m) (28)
and γ0 = γ1 = · · · = γp−2 = 0. For this special case, the error
expression (φp(0)− φ∗p(0)) in Theorem 3.2 can be reduced to
(m+ 1)λp−1(1− (1− η)m)ξp(pµp−1 +mλp) (29)
≈ m(m+ 1)ηλp−1ξp(pµp−1 +mλp) (30)
which implies that the error in our efficient calculation of
MTTDLp can be controlled by the uncorrectable error rate
of the device.
D. A recursive relation for MTTDLp
For a disk array having a fixed size of n disks, p of which
store the parity information, it might be of interest to derive
a recursive relationship for MTTDLp. Such a relationship
might be useful to predict the additional performance gain
through adding extra parity disk into the system. To simplify
our analysis, let us assume γj = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ p− 1.
Theorem 3.3: For a disk array having a fixed size of n disks,
p of which store the parity information, MTTDLp satisfies
the following recursive relationship.
MTTDLp+1 = MTTDLp +
(p+ 1)µp
λp+1(m− 1)MTTDLp
+
1
λp+1(m− 1) . (31)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
As can be seen, this performance improvement is a function
of the failure rate λp+1 and the repair rate µp. Usually,
repair rates hardly vary whereas, the failure rates increase
as more disks fail in the system. As long as the storage
system satisfies λp+1(m − 1) ≫ max{µp(p + 1), 1} then,
we have MTTDLp+1 →MTTDLp i.e., adding extra parity
disk does not improve the reliability of the whole disk array
system as the number of parity blocks tends to large numbers
(e.g. exponential failure growth). On the other hand, this
relationship is not necessarily satisfied in many storage settings
(and failure growth models), and yet we will demonstrate that
adding parity blocks shall only slightly improve the reliability
of the system using more realistic failure growth models (e.g.
logistic failure growth). These arguments will be numerically
supported for few failure rate growth models in subsection F .
E. MTTDL with initial defective disks
In previous section, we assumed Pn(0) = 1, Pj(0) =
0 for j = m+ p− 1,m+ p− 2, . . . ,m,F i.e., all constituent
disks are operational at the start of operation. However, it
is possible that when we turn the system on, some of the
defective disks will not be able to operate as expected (due
to infant mortality period). Similar type of behaviour can be
observed in the cluster level as well [38]. Thus in general, for
j = n, n−1, . . . ,m,F, we have Pj(0) = ǫj where 0 ≤ ǫj ≤ 1.
Since the erasure code is MDS, it does not matter which
disk or disks (or nodes in the cluster) were non-operational at
the onset. All it matters is the number of operational disks.
Suppose that we have m data, p parity disks with l ≤ p non-
operational disks at the beginning of the operation. This is no
different than turning the system on with m data and p − l
parity disks all operational at the beginning. Using such an
approach, we can compute MTTDLp−l for l = 0, 1, . . . , p.
Let ǫ = [ǫm+p . . . ǫm ǫF ] be the initial probabilities of
being in each state, then we have
MTTDLp,ǫ = lim
s→0
p∑
l=0
A−1p+1(s)ǫm+p−lN
(l)
p+11
T (32)
=
p∑
l=0
ǫm+p−lMTTDLp−l (33)
=
p∑
l=0
ǫm+lMTTDLl (34)
where MTTDL0 = 1/mλ0 and ǫF +
∑p
l=0 ǫn−l = 1. Note
that we slightly abused the notation and used the following
equation for convenience
MTTDLp = MTTDLp,[1 0 ... 0]1×p (35)
F. Real life failure growth and repair rates
In this study, we assume disks are in their useful life phase
[36]. A general trend would be to use increased failure rates as
we have more failed component disks within the same EPG.
Some of the real life observations demonstrate that after a
disk failure, the probability of having another failure grows
exponentially [39], [40]. This suggests that it is reasonable
to assume an exponential growth in the rate of failures after
the last failure event. However, after a particular number of
failures happen (as we deplete the number of resource/disks),
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Figure 3. Reliability performance results assuming dependent failure rates with exponential failure growth (λmax → ∞, shown in a) ) and logistic failure
growth (λmax = 10−1, shown in b) ) models. We use fixed rate repairs for different number of parities and assumed a fixed data block of size m = 200 disks
in an EPG.
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Figure 4. a) MTTDL5/MTTDL4 ratio, the effect of adding one more parity assuming logistic failure growth (λmax = 10−1) and using fixed rate
repairs. We assumed variable data block sizes. b) MTTDLp+1/MTTDLp ratio, the effect of adding one more parity assuming exponential failure growth
(λmax →∞) and logistic failure growth (λmax = 10−1) models as a function of number of parities p. We set m = 200 disks.
we would expect this growth to stabilize to a constant before
the wear-out phase is entered. Such a growth phenomenon is
known as logistic growth of failure rates [41]. We express the
logistic growth for i = 0, . . . , p with the following function,
λi =
λ0e
ir∗
1 + (eir∗ − 1) λ0λmax
(36)
where λmax is the maximum failures per hour, i.e., maximum
failure rate at which a disk might be failing. If there was no
limit on the rate of growth i.e., λmax →∞, we will have the
exponential growth (also known as Malthusian growth [42])
expressed as λi = λ0e
ir∗ implying the recursive relationship
λi+1 = λie
r∗ for some fixed r∗ > 0. Conventionally,
exponential growth is defined with the recursive relationship
λi+1 = λi(1+r) for some fixed r > 0. Therefore, for notation
convenience and better visualization we present our results in
terms of r using the transformation ln(1 + r) = r∗. We also
note that it is reasonable to assume that the disk systems are
subject to periodic maintenance and therefore we assume a
fixed repair rate µ = µ0 = · · · = µp−1 i.e., µ repairs per
hour. In general, the repair rate is a function of the erasure
code construction, the period with which the system checks
for failures, the time it takes to transfer necessary information
to recompute the failed disk data and re-balance the distributed
storage system. Thus, the repair operation can be expedited by
selecting appropriate erasure codes and system maintenance
parameters.
Using the previous assumptions and our closed form expres-
sions derived earlier, let us provide few results for MTTDLp
for p = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 using different r values and growth
rates. Let us assume we have λ0 = 4×10−6 failures and µ = 4
disk repairs per hour in an EPG that contains m = 200 disks
for raw data storage. All disks are assumed to be operational
at the beginning.
9Table I. A GENERIC (18,12) MDS CODE AND FEW PYRAMID CODES WITH THE ASSOCIATED RECOVERABILITY/EFFICIENY CHARACTERISTICS ([20]) .
Number of failed symbols/blocks 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Generic MDS Code
Recoverability (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Avg. read overhead 1.0 1.61 2.22 2.83 3.44 4.06 4.67
Pyramid Code (PC)
Recoverability (%) 100 100 100 100 100 94.12 59.32
Avg. read overhead 1.0 1.28 1.56 1.99 2.59 3.29 3.83
Generalized PC (GPC)
Recoverability (%) 100 100 100 100 100 94.19 76.44
Avg. read overhead 1.0 1.28 1.56 1.99 2.59 3.29 4.12
GPC w/o global symbols
Recoverability (%) 100 100 100 100 97.94 88.57 65.63
Avg. read overhead 1.0 1.28 1.56 1.87 2.32 2.93 3.85
Fig. 3.a demonstrates that with increasing parity, we dra-
matically increase the reliability values if the failure rates
do not change as we have more and more disk failures in
the EPG i.e., independent failure rates. However in case of
dependent failures using exponential failure growth model
with increasing r, the MDS parity schemes become quickly
obsolete in that adding more parity is nothing but a waste of
resources. For example, adding the fifth parity disk into the
disk array which is already protected by four parity disks do
not provide any improvement in terms of average reliability
statistics when r = 20. On the other hand, Fig. 3.b shows
that if we have a logistic failure growth for the constituent
disks (λmax = 10
−1, r = 20), adding parity helps improve the
system performance but this performance improvement is not
substantial as predicted by independent failure models [10].
In Fig. 4.a, we show how much we gain by adding one
more parity to an EPG which already has four parity disks for
failure protection. We vary the EPG size to see the effect of
the EPG size on the reliability performance for two different
values of r. We observe that as m gets larger, adding an extra
parity become almost useless for both values of r. In Fig. 4.b,
we plot the relative reliability gain of an EPG (m = 200 disks)
protected by p parity disks, by adding one more parity disk
to the array. We assumed both exponential and logistic failure
growths and observed that with exponential growth, there is
a limit to the number of parity disks that will be useful in
terms of MTTDL performance. After adding four parity disks,
we reach the maximum number of parity disks that can benefit
the disk array in terms of failure protection. The story changes
slightly if we assume logistic failure growth model. As can be
seen, adding more parity disks beyond four only slightly helps
the reliability performance of the disk array. Although it is
not shown explicitly, in order to get the same performance
gain we obtain by going from single parity to double parity
protection using logistic growth model, we need to have almost
120 additional parity disks. This demonstrates an instance of a
very inefficient and possibly very complex protection scheme
since we only have m = 200 data disks and in order to get
some real gains by adding parity disks beyond two, we need
almost 120 parity disks.
G. Average Read Overhead and Repair Rates
Systematic erasure codes include the original data blocks
as part of the coded blocks. Thus, accessing any data block
can be directly served by the storage system without further
computation. However, if the data block is unavailable, the
read operation has to access a subset of the remaining blocks
to recover/compute the missing data block.
The metric average read overhead, denoted as Φj(n),
represents the average number of extra whole device readings
as an overhead in order to access any unavailable data block
(degraded reads) when there are j block failures with a code
block length of n. Let us consider an example of one block
failure (j = 1) in the (18, 12) MDS code to illustrate how
this metric is computed. If the failure is a redundant/parity
block (6/18 chance), then the data blocks can be accessed
directly, so the average read overhead is 1. Otherwise, the
failure shall be a data block (12/18 chance) and the read
overhead is twelve for the failed data block and one for the rest
of the eleven data blocks. Hence, the average read overhead is
(12 + 11)/12. Altogether, the average read overhead is given
by Φ1 = 1× 6/18 + (12 + 11)/12× 12/18 ≈ 1.61.
The following theorem generalizes the average read over-
head for any (n,m) systematic block code with average
access pattern {S(n)k } where k-th data block can be computed
by accessing at least a subset S
(n)
k of available blocks for
1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Theorem 3.4: The average read overhead for a generic
(n,m) systematic block code with fixed rate m/n and access
pattern {S(n)k } when we have j ≤ n−m failures is given by
the following generalized expression
Φj(n) =
j∑
i=0
(iS(n) +m− i)(mi )(n−mj−i )
m
(
n
j
) (37)
where S(n) =
∑
k |S(n)k | is the average number of block
accesses. Furthermore, Φj(n) can be simplified as follows for
fixed rate m/n generic (n,m) block code as n→∞.
Φj(n)→ 1 + (S(n)− 1)j
n
(38)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
Using the result of Theorem 3.4, one can deduce that if the
average number of block accesses is constant with growing n
[43], then the average access overhead will approach to the
optimal value of 1 irrespective of how many failures there are.
On the other extreme for MDS codes we have S(n) = m
for all n. Thus, Φj(n)→ 1 +mj/n which clearly shows the
relationship between the average read overhead and the rate of
the code.
Although the average read overhead is not the only metric
affecting the repair process, it is usually the dominant one.
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Since the more data to access and read for the repair, the more
time it takes to repair, it is reasonable to assume repair rates
to be inversely proportional to this metric. Inspired from the
logistic growth, let us define the repair rate with respect to an
MDS code
µj , δµ
log((j + 1)ΦMDSj+1 (n))
log((j + 1)ΦPyd.j+1 (n))
= log(j+1)ΦPyd.
j+1 (n)
(
(j + 1)ΦMDSj+1 (n)
)δµ
(39)
where µ is the nominal rate of the repair per device and δ is a
constant used to model the relative bandwidth constraint (with
respect to an MDS code, in which it is normalized to be unity)
to reflect on the repair rates based on average read overhead
metric. We denote the average read overhead for MDS code
as ΦMDSj+1 (n) and for Pyramid codes as Φ
Pyd.
j+1 (n). Clearly,
this formulation assumes an inverse exponential relationship
between the nominal repair rate and the average read overhead
with respect to an MDS code.
H. A case study: Pyramid Codes for Storage
An interesting case study would be to apply the generalized
Markov model to one of the modern erasure codes such as
Pyramid Codes (PC) of Microsoft Azure Storage [20]. Pyramid
codes are designed to improve the recovery performance for
small scale device failures and have been implemented in
archival storage [44]. Pyramid codes are not MDS codes but
are constructed from standard MDS codes by creating newer
parity symbols from subsets of existing data blocks in order
to trade-off the recoverability with coding overhead and the
average read overhead, which are important parameters to
optimize for a storage application.
In principle, a pyramid code constructs local data sets and
generates local parities for these sets based on MDS codes.
Additionally, global parities are also generated to span all
of the data set for stronger protection against failures. More
details about the various construction techniques for pyramid
codes can be found in [20]. Let us use a (n = 16, m = 12)
MDS code as the basis for a set of (18, 12) pyramid codes
given in table I.
We shall either use the computed values of Φj(n) in [20]
or compute them using Theorem 3.4 (both attains the same
values) for our MTTDL evaluations. Using the generalized
Markov model of the previous section, let us further assume a
homogenous repair strategy is used in the system. Some results
are shown in table II using a nominal repair rate µ = 1/168
(1 week mean repair time), η = 10−3 and δ = 20. From the
table, we observe that basic and generalized pyramid codes
provide better durability numbers thanks to their efficient repair
mechanisms. For a given space efficiency, this is achieved due
to improved access efficiency by sacrificing the recoverability.
It has been shown that sacrificing small recoverability can
help the system to exploit a huge advantage in average read
overhead and hence the MTTDL. On the other hand, as λ
gets close to zero (∀i, λi = λ), the frequency of repairs go
down and hence the advantage of pyramid codes with global
Table II. MTTDL (HOURS) FOR BASIC MDS AS WELL AS VARIOUS
PYRAMID CODES [20] .K = 103 AND M = 106 .
Failure/Nominal Repair rates λ = 1
200K
λ = 1
500K
λ = 1
1.2M
MDS Code 2.2e+15 6.4e+17 1.3e+20
Basic PC (BPC) 1.3e+17 5.2e+18 1.7e+20
Generalized PC (GPC) 1.32e+17 5.26e+18 1.76e+20
GPC w/o global syms 1.83e+14 3e+15 4.1e+16
symbols diminishes. This can be observed with the MTTDL
results given for λ = 1/1200000. However, note that basic and
generalized PCs still outperform GPC without global symbols,
demonstrating the fact that global symbols are quite crucial in
pyramid codes for maintaining a desired level of durability. It is
also important to notice that the recoverability performance of
GPC without global symbols is adversely affected in a dramatic
fashion (particularly some 4–failure combinations could not be
recovered, see Table I) which leads to degradation in MTTDL
performance.
IV. DISK ARRAYS, DISTRIBUTED STORAGE AND DISK
ALLOCATION STRATEGIES
In real life storage applications, we have many installations
of disk arrays. This ultimately means more failures and pos-
sibly more dependency. Therefore, we need efficient coding
mechanisms that can help us have decorrelated disk failures
to obtain the gains predicted by independent failure models.
For this, we will consider a simple distributed storage network
example in which disks are allocated to different nodes of the
network.
In this study, we compare two allocation strategies of
multiple installations of 1-D MDS disk arrays into a given
storage network. These schemes are summarized in Fig. 6 and
Fig. 7. In the former one, the array elements are placed within
the same network node whereas the latter design allocates each
component disk that belongs to the same EPG to a different
network node in an attempt to minimize the correlated failures.
In order for a fair comparison, without loss of generality
we assume in each allocation policy, nodes contain the same
number of disks and hence we assume the number of EPGs is
z = m + p = n in the rest of our analysis/simulations. Note
that for t-MDS arrays, such an allocation might not be trivial.
An example allocation policy for a particular 2-D MDS disk
array system is shown in Section 4.3.
A. Horizontal Allocation of Disks
Let us assume that we have z installations of the disk array
shown in Fig. 1.a. In Fig. 6, we show how the horizontal
allocation of disks is performed in which the array elements are
placed within the same network node. Assuming independence
between different network nodes1 and for any EPG having
MTTDLHor.p , we would like to find the mean time to data
loss for the whole storage system.
1Since in real life applications, storage network nodes are placed at different
physical location and have distinct hardware support. They are also exposed
to different environmental conditions with high probability.
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Figure 5. A dependent Markov failure model for network storage nodes. In general, we have the relationship λ0 < λ1 < · · · < λz−1 to model the increasing
failure rates as we have more and more disk failures within the same column of disks.
m p
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Node 2
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Figure 6. Horizontal Allocation: A large number of installations of disk
arrays are used commercially to store data. A trivial allocation of EPG arrays
into the network nodes is shown.
In a number of experimental observations, the Weibull and
gamma distributions are shown to give better approximations to
the real lifetime failure characteristics of component disks [5].
For the sake of being more realistic, we assume an exponential
Time To Failure (TTF) distribution for each component disk
and a Weibull TTF distribution for each EPG. The ith EPG
Weibull distribution is given by
Wi(t;ωi, ki) = ωiki(ωit)
ki−1e−(ωit)
ki
E[Wi] =
1
ωi
Γ
(
1 +
1
ki
)
(40)
where ki > 0 are the shape parameters, 1/ωi > 0 are the scale
parameters of the distribution and Γ(x) =
∫∞
0 t
z−1e−tdt is the
gamma function.
Since any EPG failure will result in the whole system failure,
and if we letWs be the random variable that describes the TTF
for the whole system, we have Ws = min{W1, . . . ,Wz}. In
other words, if any EPG fails, there is no way for the whole
storage system to recover the failure. We have for any t ≥ 0,
Pr(Ws > t) = Pr(min{W1, . . . ,Wz} > t)
= Pr(Wi > t, i = 1, . . . , z)
=
z∏
i=1
Pr(Wi > t)
=
z∏
i=1
e−(ωit)
ki
= e−
∑z
i=1(ωit)
ki
(41)
Assuming all EPGs share the same scale parameter k, Eqn.
(41) reduces to
Pr(Ws > t) = e
−tk
∑z
i=1 ω
k
i = e−(
k
√∑
z
i=1 ω
k
i
t)k (42)
This implies that the TTF for the whole system has a
Weibull distribution with shape parameter k and scale param-
eter 1/ωs = (
∑z
i=1 ω
k
i )
−1/k . The mean time to data loss
is given by E[Ws] = (1/s)Γ(1 + 1/k). Since we assume
independence between different network storage nodes and if
all EPGs have the same mean time to data loss MTTDLHor.p ,
for a given fixed k, we have
ωi = ω =
Γ(1 + 1/k)
MTTDLHor.p
(43)
Using Eqn. (43), we deduce
E[Ws] =
Γ(1 + 1/k)
ωs
=
Γ(1 + 1/k)
ωz1/k
=
MTTDLHor.p
z1/k
(44)
which is in accordance with the previously predicted results
with k = 1, i.e., using exponential EPG TTF distributions [2].
B. Vertical Allocation of Disks
In Fig. 7, we show how the vertical allocation of z (we let
z = n for simplicity, it can be generalized to z > n) instal-
lations of disk arrays are deployed in which each constituent
disk that belongs to the same EPG is placed in a different
network node. An allocation policy is adapted such that the
following criterion is satisfied.
Definition 4.1: We define criterion to be the case in which
a total of z disks are allocated to the different nodes of the
storage network consisting of z nodes such that each network
node contains only one disk belonging to a particular EPG.
In Fig. 7, a trivial allocation of disks is considered so that
the criterion is satisfied. Other allocations are possible. There
are z EPGs and we assume disks in the same storage network
node are subject to dependent failure rates because of the
same hardware support and environmental conditions etc. On
the other hand, we have the storage nodes operating fairly
independently.
Since there is no parity protection across the EPGs (vertical
direction), we assume a failure model across the disks that
is shown in Fig. 5. The failure model shown in Fig. 5 is a
truncated generalized birth–death process in which each state
label designate the number of operational disks in the network
node. For large z, the steady state probabilities (πi is the
12
m p
z
Node 1
Node 2
Node j
Node j+1
Node z
Figure 7. Vertical allocation: A large number of installations of disk arrays
are used to store data. The figure is showing the allocation of component disks
of EPGs by putting the first vertical column to the first network node, second
column of disks to the second network node and so on. Other allocations are
possible as long as the criterion is satisfied.
Table III. DISK FAILURE EVENTS FROM AN EPG PERSPECTIVE AND
ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES
Number of disk
failures in a column (i)
θi= Probability of disk
having failure rate λi
Probability of disk failure
0 zpiz/z 0
1 (z − 1)piz−1/z piz−1/z
2 (z − 2)piz−2/z 2piz−2/z
3 (z − 3)piz−3/z 3piz−3/z
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
z − 1 pi1/z (z − 1)pi1/z
z 0 zpi0/z
steady state probability of being in state i) of such a process
is approximated well for j = 0, 1, . . . , z by [45]
πz−j ≈
∏j−1
m=0
(z−m)λm
µm
1 +
∑z
k=1
∏k−1
s=0
(z−s)λs
µs
(45)
For any vertical column of disks (node), if we have all z
disks operational (state z in Fig. 5), then all disks will have a
failure rate of λ0. Similarly, if we have z−1 disks operational
(state z−1), then all disks will have a failure rate of λ1 and so
on. From an EPG perspective therefore, any disk is subject to
one of the failure rates {λi, i = 0, 1, . . . , z− 1, z} with steady
state probabilities {πz−i, i = 0, 1, . . . , z − 1, z}, respectively.
We define λz , 0 for completeness, i.e., if all disks are already
failed, the rate of failure for remaining disks is zero because
there remains no disk to fail.
Suppose that the probability of a failure of a disk in an
EPG is ρi given that we have i disk failures in any column of
disks (node). Since for each disk it is equally likely to have
the failure, we have ρi = i/z. Similarly, the probability a disk
not failing given that we have i disk failures in any column
of disks of Fig. 7 is 1 − ρi. Since the probability of having
i disk failures is πz−i, the unconditional probabilities will be
given by Table III where we list all the possibilities. The total
disk failure probability ρF is then given by averaging over the
number of disk failures i,
θF =
z∑
i=0
ρiPr{i disk failures} =
z∑
i=0
iπz−i
z
(46)
Thus, we have the probability distribution given by the
probabilities {θ0, θ1, . . . , θz, θF } satisfying
∑
i θi + θF = 1.
Before the EPG decoding attempts recovery, suppose that we
have ν of such disk failures (conditioning on ν, assuming all
different ν combinations are equally likely). The probability
of having ν of such failures is binomially distributed (due to
node independence) and given by
ǫn−ν =
(
n
ν
)
ρν(1− ρ)n−ν (47)
Since we are left with n− ν operational disks, each failing
with one of the failure rates {λ0, λ1, . . . , λz−1} with probabil-
ities {πz, (z− 1)πz−1/z, . . . , π1/z} i.e., Pr{A disk fails with
rate λj} = θj = (z − j)πz−j/z. Thus, the disks in an EPG
will fail independently with the average failure rate2
λavg =
z∑
j=0
λjθj + 0.θF =
z−1∑
j=0
λj(z − j)πz−j/z (48)
If we letMTTDLp denote the mean time to data loss using
{λ0 = λavg, . . . , λn−m = λavg} and {µ0, . . . , µn−m−1}, we
will have the following mean time to data loss expression
for any EPG in the storage system. Averaging over ν using
Equation (34) yields
MTTDLV er.p =
p∑
ν=0
ǫn−νMTTDLp−ν (49)
=
p∑
ν=0
(
n
ν
)
ρν(1− ρ)n−νMTTDLp−ν(50)
Finally, using the arguments of the previous section, we can
obtain the mean time to data loss of the whole storage system
using vertical allocations and Weibull distribution for the EPG
TTF given by MTTDLV er.p /z
1/k.
C. Numerical Results
Since the main objective of this subsection is to show the
relative reliability analysis of different allocation policies, we
only show performances of one dimensional MDS arrays. The
same conclusions can be drawn with larger dimensional disk
array systems such as protected by product codes (2-D MDS
codes) [7]. In larger dimensional protection groups however,
allocation policies might not be so straightforward to meet
our objectives to decorrelate disk failure events as much as
possible.
2This is a generalization of subdividing a Poisson process. Suppose each
arrival in a Poisson process {N(t), t ≥ 0} of rate λ, is sent into one of the two
arrival processes {N1(t), t ≥ 0} and {N2(t), t ≥ 0} with probabilities p and
1 − p, respectively. The resulting processes are Poisson with rates λ1 = pλ
and λ2 = (1− p)λ, respectively. Thus, the average rate will give us the rate
of the original undivided Poisson process, i.e., λavg = λ1 + λ2 = λ. It
is straightforward to extend this argument to generalized subdivisions of the
Poisson process.
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Figure 8. Comparison of information dispersal methodologies: Horizontal
and Vertical allocations of disks into the network storage nodes.
We assume n = 200 and z = n EPGs which amounts
to 40000 disks. The reliability of such a storage system will
be presented using two different allocation policies in terms
of MTTDL. As previously assumed, let us use disks with
λ0 = 4 × 10−6 and µ0 = 4 hours and a logistic growth
with λmax = 3 × 10−2. The shape parameter k = 0.9 is
assumed for TTF Weibull distribution. In Fig. 8, we show
the results for p= 5, 6, 7, 8 using two different allocation
policies: Horizontal and Vertical Allocations. As can be seen
there is a limit to the value of r beyond which the failure
rates become detrimental and lead the vertical allocation to
give performance values below that of horizontal allocation. Of
course, this is because there is no error protection in vertical
direction. However for r < 10, the vertical allocation policy
allows greater reliability than the horizontal allocation. In fact,
for a range of r i.e., 1 ≤ r ≤ 5, MTTDL performance does
not show any dramatic change with increasing r. This is due
to the decorrelation of disk failures for large installation of
1-D MDS disk array systems. Another interesting observation
is that using vertical allocation and p = 6, the performance
is almost always greater than that of horizontal allocation and
p = 8 for the r of interest in the same figure. This suggests
that by changing the allocation policy, we can save some parity
disks and still be able to have the intended reliability for
the whole disk array system in a distributed storage setting.
Another way of reading the same figure is to look at the effect
of adding extra parities to increase the failure tolerance of
the system for a given target reliability level. We can observe
that for any given reliability target, similar diminishing returns
argument applies to the failure tolerance for going from p
parities to p + 1 parities, though it provides different gains
for horizontal and vertical allocations.
V. CONCLUSION
Disk replacement rates show significant correlation between
constituent disks that are locally stored in the same storage
network node and are found to be no where near manufac-
tures’ reported disk failure or replacement rates. Based on
the recent survey data and experimental evidences, a more
comprehensive and applicable modeling is needed to be able to
accommodate for the dependencies in different failure modes
and compensate for different data allocations. Additionally,
with the advancement of new erasure codes, novel ways of
storing data has evolved and has put new metrics in forefront
such as data regeneration, read overhead and efficient repair.
In this study, we proposed a generalized failure model that
can capture realistic parameters and provide more accurate
reliability estimations for MDS disk arrays. In particular, we
argued that instead of adding more parity locally, it may
be more convenient to disperse the data and parity across
the network to be able to have disks belonging to the same
protection group work relatively independently. Additionally,
we have shown how the average read overhead affects the
repair rates and hence the reliability of the overall storage
system. Although our discussion is simplified by using 1-
D MDS codes and straightforward allocation policies, the
results can be generalized using the proposed model to larger
dimensional and modern coding schemes in which more so-
phisticated allocation policies might be needed to be able to
find ways for decorrelated component disk operations. This is
made simple in this study by driving efficient computation of
the MTTDL metric.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
For a given integer c ≤ p, we let λp = 0, λp−1 =
0, . . . , λc = 0 and µp−1 = 0, . . . , µc−1 = 0. Therefore using
the matrix Ap+2, we will have
[
Ac+1 0
0 sIp+2−c−1
]


Lpn(s)
Lpn−1(s)
...
Lpn−(c−1)(s)
LpF (s)
...
LpF (s)


=


1
0
...
0


⇒ Ac+1


Lpn(s)
Lpn−1(s)
...
Lpn−(c−1)(s)
LpF (s)

 =


1
0
...
0


and sLpF (s) = 0. This argument implies that the expressions
given for Ap+2 (an EPG using m data disks) can be used to
find expressions for Ac+1 with c ≤ p (an EPG using n+1− c
data disks).
For m = 1 (single data disk) is the trivial case, we focus
on the inductive step for m > 1. For this, we start with
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Figure 9. Markov failure model for m and m + 1 data disks where the size of the EPG is fixed and equals to n. F: Failure state if m data disks are being
utilized.
considering the Fig. 9. In 9 a. we show the generalized Markov
failure model using m data disks whereas 9 b. shows the same
model and same size EPG having m+1 data disks. In order to
go from 9 a. to 9 b., it is straightforward to see that we must
set µn−m−1 = 0. This implies if we have m + 1 data disks
for an n-disk EPG, we can recover up to p− 1 disk failures.
If we have more than p− 1 whole disk failures, no repair can
put the EPG back in operation. Also, from transform domain
equations (given above) by setting µn−m−1 = 0 and s = 0,
we obtain
−λn−m−1(m+ 1)LPm+1(0) + λn−mmLPm(0) = Pm(0) = 0
which implies that λn−m−1(m + 1)LPm+1(0) =
λn−mmLPm(0). Furthermore, we have LPm+1(0) =
LPm(0)⇔ λn−m−1(m+ 1) = λn−mm.
In the inductive step, let us assume the given expressions
are true for an EPG using m data disks and show that they
are true for an EPG using m+1 data disks. First note that for
x = 0, 1, . . . , p− 2, we have
p−1∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j) = ((p− 1)µp−2 + λp−1(m+ 1))
p−2∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j) (51)
It is easy to verify that we have φp(0) = mλpφp−1(0) where
φp(0) =
∏p
i=0 λi(m+ i). if we let m→ m+1 and p→ p−1,
we have LPm(0)→ LPm+1(0). Finally, we have LPm+1(0) =
LPm(0) ⇒ λn−m−1(m + 1) = λn−mm. Now, using these
results and the inductive assumption with µn−m−1 = 0 and
(m+ 1)λp−1 = mλp, we finally have
LPm+p−x(0) =
(pµp−1 + λpm)
φp(0)
p−1∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j)
=
1
φp−1(0)
((p− 1)µp−2
+ λp−1(m+ 1))
p−2∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j)
= LP(m+1)+(p−1)−x(0) (52)
where LP(m+1)+(p−1)−x(0) is the expression obtained from the
expression given for LPm+p−x(0) by replacing m with m+ 1
and p with p−1. This simply implies that we can use the same
expression to obtain reliability values when p → p− 1 while
n = m+ p is kept fixed. Now we consider if x = p− 1. From
the inductive assumption, we have
LPm(0) =
1
φp(0)
p−1∏
i=0
λi(m+ 1 + i)
=
1
mλpφp−1(0)
p−1∏
i=0
λi(m+ 1 + i)
=
1
φp−1(0)
p−2∏
i=0
λi(m+ 2 + i) (53)
Since LPm+1(0) = LPm(0) ⇔ λp−1(m + 1) = λpm, we
have the Eqn. (53). This completes the proof. 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
For a fixed n, let us start with a explicit expression for
MTTDLp+1 (using m− 1 data disks),
((p+ 1)µp + λp+1(m− 1))
φp+1(0)
p∑
x=0
p∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λp+1x (j) +
1
λp+1(m− 1) .
(54)
It is easy to verify that we have
φp+1(0) = λp+1(m− 1)φp(0). (55)
Also, we have the following algebraic manipulation to use
p∑
x=0
p∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λp+1x (j) =
p−1∑
x=0
p∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λp+1x (j) +
p∏
j=0
j 6=p
Λp+1x (j)
= (λpm+ pµp−1)
p−1∑
x=0
p−1∏
j=0
j 6=x
Λpx(j)
+
p−1∏
j=0
λj(m+ 1 + j). (56)
Let us plug Eqns. (55) and (56) into the Eqn. (54), we have
MTTDLp+1 =
(p+ 1)µp + λp+1(m− 1)
λp+1(m− 1) MTTDLp
+
1
λp+1(m− 1) (57)
as desired. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4
Let us assume we have 0 ≤ j ≤ n − m failed blocks.
Of these failures, let us suppose that i out of j failures
happen in the m data blocks and the remaining j − i failures
happen in the rest of n − m parity blocks. The overhead
conditioned on j failures depends on which i data blocks are
failed because S
(n)
k s might be different. Let us consider each
i failure combinations and for each we sum the total number
of accesses. This expression is given by
(mi )∑
s=1
∑
c∈Cs
|S(n)c | =
(
m
i
)
i
m
m∑
k=1
|S(n)k | =
(
m
i
)
iS(n) (58)
where Cs is the set of indexes corresponding to s-th com-
bination of all
(
m
i
)
combinations and S(n) =
∑
k |S(n)k | is
the average number of block accesses. On the other hand,
for unfailed m− i blocks, we have access overhead of unity.
Since we sum all the different combinations, we finally have(
m
i
)
(m − i) access read overhead. Since the rest of the
j − i failures on the parity blocks can happen in different
combinations, we have the following total number of accesses((
m
i
)
iS(n) +
(
m
i
)
(m− i)
)(
n−m
j − i
)
. (59)
This number shall be divided by all possible combinations(
n
j
)
multiplied by the number of data blocksm. Since selecting
any data block is equally likely, we have division bym. Finally,
we sum over all possible i to find the unconditional average
overhead which is given by Equation (37).
If we inspect the hypergeometric probability term in Equa-
tion (37), it is easy to see that we have(
m
i
)(
n−m
j−i
)
(
n
j
) = (j
i
) i∏
r=1
m− i+ r
n− i+ r
j−i∏
s=1
n−m− (j − i) + s
n− j + s
(60)
which yields
lim
n→∞
(
m
i
)(
n−m
j−i
)
(
n
j
) = (j
i
)
(m/n)i(1−m/n)j−i (61)
where convergence happens as n→∞ for constant m/n. We
now can express Equation (37) as follows
lim
n→∞
Φj(n) =
j∑
i=0
(
1 +
i(S(n)− 1)
m
)(
j
i
)(m
n
)i (
1− m
n
)j−i
(62)
which implies limn→∞ Φj(n) = 1 +
(S(n)−1)
m j(m/n) from
which the result follows. 
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